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well the excitement of seeing the men

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land on the moon and of course the more

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important in part that I was more

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involved in is the large vehicle so the

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actual launch of of Apollo 11 at the

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Cape that that I will never forget that

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and then the long period of waiting to

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file they won the enroute to the moon to

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see how everything was going to go and

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then the final touchdown on the moon of

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course we all had confidence it would

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happen but it was a great relief see it

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happened I was at the Cape at the time

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of the launch of course because we were

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involved very heavily in the launch

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vehicle I was in the there's two control

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rooms there and they have the the

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control room where the people on the

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consoles and I was in an adjoining

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control room where we were readily

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available for consultation at that time

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so I was there when when the Apollo 11

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was launched and that was big thrill

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because we'd seen earlier Saturn's

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launch but there was nothing like the

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one that was supposed to go to the moon

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so you know I came home after that

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actually our mission was complete once

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the we were injected into orbit and on

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into the lunar trajectory translunar

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trajectory but there was a lot of long

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hours and days of waiting to be sure

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that everybody else's system worked

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because we of course we're not

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responsible here at Marshall nor was I

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responsible for the actual landing

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system so I was at home watching it on

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TV when the actual landing occurred and

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a lot of people that wanted to be in

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somewhere for a party and whatever but I

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was I didn't feel I was still too

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concerned I wanted to be alone with my

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family I think that that was a great

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relief great jubilation when it happened

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but nothing compared to when they

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actually landed back on the earth you

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know there was still that concern even

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while they won't the moon it was always

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the nagging concern is everything going

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well if the mission was there the goal

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clearly established and we all had

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confidence in ourselves there was a lot

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of work that led up to the actual

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development of the Saturn 5 it certainly

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wasn't something that you just made the

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big step launched off on developing that

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launch vehicle we were already the team

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was already in place here even before

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NASA and that as the part of ABMA we

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were already working on a precursor to

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the Saturn launch vehicle and we were

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using the systems we had developed for

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the army specifically the Jupiter and

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the Redstone missiles and if you look at

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the Saturn 1 stage that you see on

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display at the Museum you see a cluster

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of smaller tanks around a large one

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that's really a bunch of red stones

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clustered around a Jupiter and that's

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the way we started we we perfected the

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Redstone taking it one step at a time

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and then the the Jupiter and then when

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we got the charter from the Advanced

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Research Projects Agency before NASA to

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to already start on a large launch

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vehicle we we took that technology which

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was very simple and crude compared to

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what we have today things were much

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simpler back then we digital computers

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were almost non-existent and so we did

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everything in a in a simpler way then

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then we now do things like on the

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shuttle program but it was a team that

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was built up over a number of years and

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we all knew each other and had

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confidence in each other and had a good

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working relationship and of course the

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the thing that held it all together was

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dr. von Braun and everybody is respect

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for him and he was truly a team leader

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and we really worked as a team we had

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and you own the cutting edge of

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technology you were doing things never

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been done before but even though you

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didn't have the experience if you ran

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into a problem you could always be sure

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that there was some specialists within

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the center that had a technical

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background that could help you get

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through that and solve that problem so

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it was working it really was a team

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effort you hear about the von braun team

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that's just that's not just a phrase

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that's a fact that's the way it worked

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and we all you know the lines of

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organization were maybe not as clearly

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drawn as some people like to see them

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and you know you you try to explain how

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the organization worked it's sort of

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difficult but it's because we knew each

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other and respected each other and work

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together and and if there was ever

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problems you know we knew the guy at the

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top dr. von Braun would step in and make

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a decision if there was a difference of

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technical opinion and everybody

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respected his his judgment I mean all

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the way from minor things to very major

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things so it was a it was truly a team

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effort involving a lot of

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well he was I guess he was probably a

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genius he was a great communicator but

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he was technically very astute and he

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had been interested in space from very

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early childhood essentially and had such

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a tremendous background personally from

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his experience even as a teenager and on

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into his 20s before he got seriously

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into the the missile business and the

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space business and he was such a

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magnetic personality and he always made

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you feel a part of things he never put

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anybody down I never saw him chastise

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anyone publicly I'm sure he may have

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called some people in privately on

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occasion but it was always he it was

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even an easy man to follow in an easy

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man to respect and he made you feel like

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you were part of things than that your

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opinion counted even from the very

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remembrance to to and I'd only been here

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three days and was working in the back

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of an old warehouse 44 81 on a helium

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leak detector with a technician and all

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of a sudden here shows up von Braun I'd

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been here three days and this was such a

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remote area I didn't think I would see

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him for months and he showed up with my

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lab director wanting to see what what we

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were working on and he isn't the lab

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director in some difference of opinion

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about this technical application of this

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device so he turns to me and asked me

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what is my opinion and that was

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something I noticed from from that very

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first event all the way through the

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Saturn Apollo program he had he would

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always call you in if you were present

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for a meeting where a significant

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decision was being made he would go

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around the room and ask well what is

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your opinion and he he would whether he

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was sitting you were frontline are

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sitting at the table or whether you're

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sitting in the back of the room he would

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always look around and you try to get to

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draw the opinions out of of everybody

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and be sure that that everyone felt they

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were part of things so I think that's

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the key to it he was truly a team

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he was a leader and that everyone

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respected and he had that in a technical

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capability of understanding enough about

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all disciplines that he could he could

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explain it he come through the lab and

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ask you a few questions about some

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intricate device you're working on and

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new exciter he'd come through and

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explained in detail that same device to

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a visitor he he comprehended things well

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enough to and he could put things in

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terms that the layman could understand

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and I think that was part of his great

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value not only communicator with

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internal within Marshall and Nasser but

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his ability to communicate with Congress

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I mean he was highly respected because

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he could put things in terms that the

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layman or the politicians could

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understand so he was an invaluable asset

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from that standpoint just only

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well I was responsible for at that time

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for the instrument unit which

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incorporated all of the guidance and

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control instrumentation communication

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computer systems and also the control

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actuators that are up and down the the

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stages of Saturn I had been involved in

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the development earlier of the control

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systems and then became responsible for

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the total system before the actual

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landing that was in 1968 when I became

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the director of astronautics laboratory

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which had I had the responsible for the

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total instrument unit

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well the instrument unit was built here

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it was focused here in hospital we

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realized from the outset that we that

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this was going to be a very complex job

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to bring together essentially the the

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total brains of the Saturn 5 vehicle and

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that would be desirable to have it very

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closely under control of the local

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Marshall group because we had already

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done a great deal of the

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conceptualization of how the system

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would work so the plan was to bring a

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contractor to Huntsville who who would

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have the the background to do this and

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this would not be a typical aerospace

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company it would not be a Boeing or

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McDonnell Douglas or company that would

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normally build the the structure in the

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propulsion system so we dr. von Braun

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decided we should select the company

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that that had the in-depth technical

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capability in the electronic field an

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electrical field and we selected IBM and

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a small group of us are well remember we

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went to IBM and and looked at their

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situation there at a we go to see if

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they had the kind of capability we were

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looking at and and we decided that IBM

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was certainly a good good choice for

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that system where the emphasis would be

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not only even though this is a piece of

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the structure the importance of it is

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the the things that are inside that

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structure and it's just chock full of

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electrical electronic

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an electromechanical system so dr. von

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Braun convinced IBM that they should

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actually set up a facility here in

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hospital he was a very persuasive man

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and whether they really that was

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necessarily in their best business

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interest or not they they certain agreed

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to do it and they moved a group here and

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set up the group that that actually

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implemented the the instrument unit

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design of course the elements of the

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instrument unit were built by a number

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of different contractors it is the

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brains of the vehicle it has the

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stabilized platform with the

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accelerometers and gyros that that give

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you the information of what your angle

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is attitude angle and your position in

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flight and it has the the key part of

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the instrument unit at the heart of it

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would be the the computer which was a

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triple modular computer and that was

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designed and built by IBM and that was

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one of the reasons for selecting them

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but that was the most complex piece of

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the of the instrument unit and we

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evolved this technique together with IBM

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to build a computer that even with

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failures you could still continue and

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that's what we called a triple modular

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redundancy same several failures and

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would continue to operate so that

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developing that computer and the

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software that went with it as well as

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all the peripheral systems that the

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input sensors gyros rate gyros

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accelerometers angle-of-attack sensors

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all that information goes into that

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computer and then information that comes

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out commands the control actuators on

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the stage there's a network that goes up

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and down the total vehicle the command

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they control actuators that gimble the

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engines but all of that was concentrated

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here along with the instrumentation the

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power systems the batteries everything

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to be integrated right here in hospital

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and that worked out very well we

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didn't have any failures of that system

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that even even this triple modular

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redundancy we had in that flight

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computer that never was a single flight

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failure so we even though in that sense

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we over designed in a sense that we had

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but that was the most complex part of

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the system and we felt that we had to

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have that capability but it was it is

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the brains of the system and keeping it

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on two very close control and close

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scrutiny here where they're all the

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system engineering was done was a key

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well it certainly was a tremendous

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achievement and I think it was it was

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just based on a focus of a goal it was

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set it was new new technology and it

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certainly was a major achievement and

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the fact that that this program was

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carried out without any flight

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casualties is is a very phenomenal thing

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when you think of the thousands and even

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hundreds of thousands of parts that had

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to work and even though we used

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techniques redundancy techniques so if

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you had a failure one failure some other

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system would would back up one that had

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failed that was certainly not Universal

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there are many many many single failure

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points in in the Saturn fire vehicle and

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the fact that that vehicle could be

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constructed and tested in a manner that

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that you could actually accomplish these

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missions with no flight fatality of

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course there was the one unfortunate

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incident on the on the pad and that was

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back when we had a full oxygen

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atmosphere and the spark electrical

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spark had actually ignited it and so we

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had to go back and restructure reassess

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and come up with a less dangerous

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approach there but just the fact that

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all of that happened and and that we

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really did it without any human

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fatalities I think is phenomenal it's

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really one of the greatest achievements

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that I've certainly the greatest

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achievement I've ever witnessed and I

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would say you could go back centuries